An Introduction to the Economics of Information Incentives and Contracts 2nd Edition by Ines Macho Stadler, David Perez Castrillo 9780191512070 0191512079

An Introduction to the Economics of Information Incentives and Contracts 2nd Edition by Ines Macho Stadler, David Perez Castrillo – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 9780191512070, 0191512079
Full download An Introduction to the Economics of Information Incentives and Contracts 2nd Edition after payment

Product details:

ISBN 10: 0191512079
ISBN 13: 9780191512070
Author: Ines Macho Stadler, David Perez Castrillo

This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. The authors indicate substantial real-world applications, and exercises for students (with solutions) are provided at the end of each chapter.

An Introduction to the Economics of Information Incentives and Contracts 2nd Table of contents:

1 Introduction

1.1. Introduction

1.2. The Elements of the Problem

1.3. The Intertemporal Development of the Relationship and the Reference Framework

1.4. Types of Asymmetric Information Problems

1.4.1. Moral hazard

1.4.2. Adverse selection

1.4.3. Signalling

2 The Base Model

2.1. Introduction

2.2. Description of the Model

2.3. Symmetric Information Contracts

2.3.1. The optimal payment mechanism

2.3.2. The optimal level of effort

Exercises

3 The Moral Hazard Problem

3.1. Introduction

3.2. The Moral Hazard Problem

3.3. The Agent Chooses between Two Effort Levels

3.4. Solution Using the First-Order Approach

3.5. A Simple Case with Continuous Effort

3.6. Moral Hazard with Hidden Information

3.7. Some Comments on the Simple Moral Hazard Models

3.7.1. The value of information

3.7.2. Mechanisms based on severe punishments

3.7.3. The strategic effects of contracts

3.7.4. What happens when it is the agent who offers the contract?

3A. Complementary Material

3A.1. A geometric illustration of the moral hazard problem

3A.2. The problem that may be found when applying the first-order approach

3A.3. The risk neutral agent case

3B. Applications

3B.1. Incentives for managers

3B.2. Fishing contracts between countries

3B.3. Moral hazard and rationing in the credit market

3B.4. Introduction of know-how in technology transfer contracts

Exercises

3C. Advanced Themes

3C.1. Optimal payment mechanisms in situations of moral hazard with several agents

3C.2. Organizational design in relationships with several agents

3C.3. Moral hazard with several tasks

3C.4. Repeated moral hazard

3C.5. Relationships between several principals and one agent

4 The Adverse Selection Problem

4.1. Introduction

4.2. A Model of Adverse Selection

4.3. When Principals Compete for Agents

4.3.1. The benchmark: Symmetric information

4.3.2. Principals cannot distinguish agent type

4.4. Adverse Selection with a Continuum of Possible Types

4.5. Comments

4A. Complementary Material

4A.1. Implementable mechanisms

4A.2. Moral hazard with private information (ex ante contract acceptance)

4B. Applications

4B.1. Competition between insurance companies

4B.2. An analysis of optimal licensing contracts

4B.3. Regulation in asymmetric information contexts

4B.4. Decision of monopoly product quality

Exercises

4C. Advanced Themes

4C.1. Relationship with several agents: Auctions

4C.2. Organization design

4C.3. Repeated adverse selection

4C.4. Models of moral hazard and adverse selection

4C.5. Several principals

5 Signalling

5.1. Introduction

5.2. The Value of Private Information and of Signalling

5.3. Education as a Signal

5.4. The Agents Signal their Characteristic

5.4.1. Separating equilibrium

5.4.2. Pooling equilibrium

5.4.3. Conclusion

5.5. The Informational Power of Contracts

5.5.1. Symmetric information

5.5.2. The agent is uninformed as to difficulty of the job

5.5.3. Separating equilibra

5.6. Comments

5A. Complementary Material

5A.1. The intuitive criterium

5B. Applications

5B.1. Prices that signal quality

5B.2. Optimal licensing contracts when the seller has private information

5B.3. Debt level as a signal of the value of a firm

Exercises

5C. Advanced Themes

5C.1. Equilibrium refinements

5C.2. Cheap-talk games

5C.3. Optimal design of mechanisms in signalling models

People also search for An Introduction to the Economics of Information Incentives and Contracts 2nd:

the economics of information technology an introduction
    
economics introduction quizlet
    
economics introduction to economics quiz
    
an introductory course in microeconomics is likely to study
    
an introduction to the economics of information incentives and contracts

Tags: Economics, Information, Incentives, Ines Macho Stadler, David Perez Castrillo