The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism 1st Edition by Allan Hazlett 0191995584 9780191995583

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ISBN 10: 0191995584 

ISBN 13: 9780191995583

Author: Allan Hazlett 

Most people have wondered whether anything really matters, some have temporarily thought that nothing really matters, and some philosophers have defended the view that nothing really matters. However, if someone thinks that nothing matters–if they are a “nihilist about value”–then it seems that it is irrational for them to care about anything. It seems that nihilism about value mandates total indifference. This is the “problem of nihilism” Allan Hazlett addresses in The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism. Hazlett argues that the problem of nihilism arises because desire–and thus caring–is a species of evaluation that admits of irrationality. This contradicts the influential Humean view that desire does not admit of irrationality, which has a ready solution to the problem of nihilism: since desire does not admit of irrationality, it cannot be irrational to care about something that you believe does not matter. However, following G.E. Anscombe, Hazlett argues that desire has the same relationship to goodness as belief has to truth: just as truth is the accuracy condition for belief, goodness is the accuracy condition for desire. This reveals desire as an appropriate target of epistemological inquiry, in the same way that belief is an appropriate target of epistemological inquiry. Desires can amount to knowledge (in the same way that beliefs can amount to knowledge) and, crucially for the problem of nihilism, desire admits of irrationality (in the same way that belief admits of irrationality). Nevertheless, although it is obviously irrational to believe something that you believe is not true, Hazlett argues that it is not irrational to desire something you believe is not good, despite the fact that goodness is the accuracy condition for desire. This provides a solution to the problem of nihilism, and shows that nihilism about value can coherently be combined with the anti-Humean view that desire is a species of evaluation.

The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism 1st Table of contents: 

1: Introduction
1.1 The Thought That Nothing Matters
1.2 The Humean Solution
1.3 The Problem of Nihilism and the Nature of Desire
1.4 Desire as Non-Instrumental
1.5 The Practical Theory of Desire
1.6 Desire as Evaluation
1.7 The Evaluative Belief Theory of Desire
1.8 The Evaluative Perception Theory of Desire
1.9 The Prospective Theory of Desire
1.10 AD Is Not a Theory of Desire
1.11 Desire and the Emotions
1.12 The Epistemology of Desire
1.13 Synopsis
2: Accurate Desire
2.1 Truth as the Accuracy Condition for Belief
2.2 Goodness as the Accuracy Condition for Desire
2.3 Desire as Propositional
2.4 Propositional Goodness
2.5 Aversion
2.6 “Good” vs. “Good For”
2.7 Degrees of Goodness and Strength of Desire
2.8 Axial Gaps
2.9 Axial Gluts?
2.10 Desiring the Bad
2.11 Conclusion
3: Why Criticize Desires for the Bad?
3.1 Axial Criticism of Desires
3.2 Desires for the Bad Are Inaccurate
3.3 Desires for the Bad Depend on False Beliefs
3.4 Desires for the Bad Are Abnormal
3.5 Desires for the Bad Are Vicious
3.6 Desires for the Bad Might Have Bad Consequences
3.7 Desires for the Bad Are Bad
3.8 Desires for the Bad Are Unfitting
3.9 Desires for the Bad Are Unreasonable
3.10 Desires for the Bad Are Desires There Is a Reason Not to Have
3.11 Conclusion
4: Desire That Amounts to Knowledge
4.1 Orectic Knowledge as Knowledge of Goodness
4.2 The Ethical Importance of Orectic Knowledge
4.3 Knowledge as Apt Mental Representation
4.4 An Account of Orectic Knowledge
4.5 Sources of Orectic Knowledge
4.6 Orectic Knowledge and Epistemic Luck
4.7 Conclusion
5: Irrational Desire
5.1 Irrationality and Deliberation
5.2 Desire and Deliberation
5.3 Doxastic Deliberation
5.4 Attitude Formation through Deliberation
5.5 Orectic Deliberation Is Not Practical Deliberation
5.6 Orectic Deliberation Is Not Instrumental Doxastic Deliberation
5.7 A Case
5.8 Orectic Deliberation
5.9 Acedia
5.10 Is Acedia Irrational?
5.11 Orectic Deliberation Is Not (the Same Thing as) Evaluative Doxastic Deliberation
5.12 Why Is Desire Susceptible to Deliberation?
5.13 Conclusion
6: The Problem
6.1 Statement of the Problem
6.2 The Realist Solution
6.3 The Expressivist Solution
6.4 The Humean Solution, Again
6.5 The Egoistic Solution
6.6 The Relativistic Solution
6.7 The Perspectival Solution
6.8 The Naturalist Solution
6.9 Conclusion
7: Desiring the Neutral
7.1 Strong Incoherence
7.2 The Risk of Contradiction
7.3 Weak Incoherence
7.4 James’ Two Intellectual Duties
7.5 Non-Accurate Representation
7.6 Why Weak Incoherence Is Rationally Permissible
7.7 Preference
7.8 Why It Matters That We Already Have Desires
7.9 Conclusion

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Tags: The Epistemology, Desire, the Problem, Nihilism, Allan Hazlett